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IMMIGRATION LAW AND THE REFUGEE-A
RECOMMENDATION TO HARMONIZE THE
STATUTES WITH THE TREATIES
I would not read the law narrowly to make it the duty
of our officials to send [an alien] . . . to what may be per-

secution or death. Technicalities need not enmesh us. The
spirit of the law provides the true guide. It makes plain, I
think, that . . . the Attorney General is authorized to save

a human being from persecution in a Communist land.'
William 0. Douglas, 1958
With these words, Justice Douglas in a dissenting opinion
protested the forced return of an alien to Communist China. In
1970, another alien was bound, gagged, beaten into unconsciousness and forcibly returned to a Soviet ship after requesting asylum
aboard an American Coast Guard Vessel.2 The common denominator in the cases of these aliens is that neither received a hearing
on the merits of his asylum request.' Only since 1972 has it been
the stated policy of the United States to grant such a hearing for
each asylum request.4 This policy is consistent with the terms of
1. Leng May Ma v. Barber, 357 U.S. 185, 192 (1958) (Douglas, J. dissenting).
2. N.Y. Times, Nov. 29, 1970, at 1, col. 2.
3. See generally id.; Leng May May. Barber, 357 U.S. 185 (1958).
4. Significant portions of United States asylum policy follow:
Policy. Both within the United States and abroad, foreign nationals who
request asylum of the U.S. Government owing to persecution or fear of
persecution should be given full opportunity to have their requests considered on their merits. The request of a person for asylum or temporary refuge shall not be arbitrarily or summarily refused by U.S. personnel. Because of the wide variety of circumstances which may be
involved, each request must be dealt with on an individual basis, taking
into account humanitarian principles, applicable laws and other factors.
Uf.S. Objectives. A basic objective of the United States is to promote
institutional and individual freedom and humanitarian concern for the
treatment of the individual.
Through the implementation of generous policies of asylum and assistance for political refugees, the United States provides leadership
toward resolving refugee problems.
Background. A primary consideration in U.S. asylum policy is the "Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees," to which the United States is
a party. . . .
As a party to the Protocol, the United States has an international treaty obligation for its implementation within areas subject
to jurisdiction of the United States.
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the Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, 5 to which the
United States acceded in 1968.6
The effect of accession to the Protocol was to make applicable to the United States 7 articles 2 through 34 of the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees.8 The Protocol and
Convention each define the term "refugee", 9 and guarantee
certain rights to the refugee while within the borders of one of
the contracting nations.' °

Several sections of the Immigration and Nationality Act" correspond to the provisions of the Protocol and Convention. For
example, section 203(a)(7) allots conditional entries to aliens
who are fleeing persecution.' 2 Section 243(h) permits the Attorney General to withhold deportation of an alien to a country where
he would be subject to persecution.' 3 Finally, section 212(d)(5) of
the Act 14 has been used to "parole" refugees into the United States
who were unable to enter under section 203(a)(7)."3
Dep't of State Policy Statement, Public Notice 351, 37 Fed. Reg. 3447 (1972)
[hereinafter cited as Policy Statement].
5. Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, October 15, 1968, 19 U.S.T.
6223, T.I.A.S. No. 6577 [hereinafter cited as Protocol]; see Policy Statement,
note 4, supra.

6. See President Johnson's statement proclaiming the Protocol Relating to
the Status of Refugees at 19 U.S.T. 6257.
7. Protocol, supra note 5, at 6224.
8. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, October 15, 1968, 19
U.S.T. 6260, T.I.A.S. No. 6577 [hereinafter cited as Convention].
9. Id., art. I, paras. 2, 3; Convention, supra note 8, art. I at 6261.
10. See Convention, supra note 8, arts. 2-34; Letter of Submittal from Secretary of State Rusk to President Johnson, July 25, 1968, S. ExEc. K, 90th Cong.,
2d Sess. VI (1968) [hereinafter cited as Letter to President Johnson].
11. Immigration and Nationality Act, ch. 477, 66 Stat. 166 (1952), 8
U.S.C. (1970) [hereinafter cited as Act].
12. Id., § 203(a)(7), 8 U.S.C. § 1153(a)(7) (1970).
13. Id., § 243(h), 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h) (1970).
14. Id., § 212(d)(5), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5) (1970).
15. § 212(d)(5) provides:
The Attorney General may in his discretion parole into the United
States temporarily under such conditions as he may prescribe for
emergent reasons or for reasons deemed strictly in the public interest any
alien applying for admission to the United States, but such parole of
such alien shall not be regarded as an admission of the alien and when
the purposes of such parole shall . . . have been served the alien shall
forthwith return or be returned to the custody from which he was
paroled and thereafter his case shall continue to be dealt with in the
same manner as that of any other applicant for admission to the United
States.
Since the enactment of this law, nearly one million refugees have entered the
United States under its provisions. Following the Hungarian revolution in 1956,
approximately 32,000 refugees who fled that country were paroled into the United
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IMMIGRATION LAW AND REFUGEES

Despite United States asylum policy, it appears that immigration law fails to conform to the requirement that all asylum requests be considered on their merits. The purpose of this com-

ment is to focus upon this apparent shortcoming and to recommend a solution through application of the terms of the Protocol
and Convention.
In treating this problem, several recent cases will be examined which indicate judicial attitudes toward the Protocol and
Convention. Next, section 203 (a) (7) of the Act will be compared with the Protocol definition of "refugee" to determine
where these enactments materially vary. This will be followed
by treatment of the problem's most critical area: a comparison
between the terms of the Act and Convention which deal with
forcible return of refugees. To present these subjects in the
proper context, it is first necessary to examine the background and
history leading to adherence to the Protocol by the United States.
States. Remarks by Mr. H.L. Hardin, Assistant Commissioner, Inspections, Immigration & Naturalization Service, at the Conference of the Association of Immigration and Nationality Lawyers, New Orleans, La., May 25, 1972, 49 INTERPRETER
RELEASES 247 (1972)
[hereinafter cited as Remarks]. In 1962, President Kennedy indicated that several thousand refugees from mainland China who were temporarily located in Hong Kong would be paroled into the United States. 46 DEP'T
STATE BULL. 993 (1962).
Ultimately, approximately 15,000 Chinese entered.
U.S. NEWS AND WORLD Rm"T, May 5, 1975, at 22 [hereinafter cited as U.S.
NEws].

The most extensive use of section 212(d) (5) was in connection with Cuban
refugees fleeing Castro's regime. Fragomen, The Refugee: A Problem of Definition, 3 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 45 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Fragomen].
675,000 Cubans utilized this section to find a haven in this country. In addition,
approximately 20,000 refugees from Eastern European countries and about 1300
Ugandans of Asian origin were admitted to the United States under this section.
On April 22, 1975, Attorney General Edward Levi issued an order authorizing
the parole of up to 132,000 South Vietnamese and Cambodian refugees into the
United States. U.S. NEWS, supra, at 22-23. By June 15, 1975, more than 131,000
Vietnamese and Cambodians had reached reception centers in the Western Pacific
and on the mainland. L.A. Times, June 24, 1975, at 1, col. 5.
Parole is also frequently used in the case of a person seeking to immigrate.
Pending final determination of the immigrant's right to enter, he can be paroled
into the United States. 8 C.F.R. § 212.5 (1975). This process spares the immigrant from detention pending the determination of his case, and spares the government the cost of such detention. See Leng May Ma v. Barber, 357 U.S. 185
(1958).
The status of the parolee is unchanged despite the parole since the parolee
is still technically and legally in custody at the boundary line of the United States
awaiting the determination and order of the immigration officials. Kaplan v. Tod,
267 U.S. 228 (1925); Dong Wing Ott v. Shaughnessy, 247 F.2d 769 (2d Cir.
1957). Cf. Siu Fung Luk v. Rosenberg, 409 F.2d 555 (9th Cir.), cert. dismissed,
396 U.S. 801 (1969).
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BACKGROUND AND HISTORY

The Convention, to which the United States was not a party, 16
was adopted as an instrument to consolidate previous multilateral
refugee enactments.' 7 It was especially designed to provide for
the post-World War II refugee situation with particular emphasis
upon the problems in Europe.' 8 The earlier enactments had defined refugees as those individuals who fell within specific
categories, 9 such as "refugees coming from Germany."20 Adoption of the Convention was significant because it was the first international instrument which classified individuals as refugees on
the basis of a legal definition of "refugee". 2 ' Also, the Convention goes further than the earlier enactments by setting forth certain fundamental principles and by guaranteeing specific rights.22
The Convention's definition of "refugee" included a "dateline" of January 1, 1951. Only persons who became refugees as
a result of occurrences prior to this date were to receive the Convention's protection.
After 1951, it became increasingly diffi16.

Weis, The Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, 42 INTER[hereinafter cited as Convention on Refugees]. For
a list of nations which are parties to the Convention, see S. ExEc. K, 90th Cong.,
2d Sess. 25 (1968).
17. Weis, The 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees and Some
Questions of the Law of Treaties, 42 BRIT. YEARBOOK OF INT'L L. 39 (1967)
[hereinafter cited as Protocol on Refugees]; see Convention, supra note 8, art.
IA(1) at 6261.
18. The Senate Committee on Foreign Relations during its hearings on the
Protocol received the following testimony:
When the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees was developed under UN auspices in 1951, its framers had very much in mind
the large problem at that time in Western Europe of hundreds of
thousands of refugees who had fled or been displaced from East European Communist countries during and after World War I. The asylum
countries of Western Europe were beset with a multitude of grave economic and other problems in the aftermath of World War H. The framers of the Convention recognized the need to secure for these refugees,
within asylum countries and third countries to which they might be resettled, a number of specific rights designed to improve their legal, political, economic, and social status. Even more important, they sought to
protect refugees from involuntary repatriation.
The Convention [was] thus to a degree European-oriented ...
Statement of Laurence A. Dawson, Acting Deputy Director, Office of Refugee
and Migration Affairs, Department of State, S. ExEc. REPT. No. 14, 90th Cong.,
2d Sess. 6 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Statement of Laurence A. Dawson].
19. See Convention on Refugees, supra note 16, at 2.
20. Convention Concerning the Status of Refugees Coming from Germany,
done at Geneva, February 10, 1938, 192 L.N.T.S. 59.
21. Convention on Refugees, supra note 16, at 2.
22. Id.
23. Convention, supra note 8, art. IA(2), IB at 6261-6262.
PRETER RELEASES 1 (1965)

https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwilj/vol6/iss1/11

4

Hill: Immigration Law and the Refugee--A Recommendation to Harmonize th
IMMIGRATION LAW AND REFUGEES

cult to link situations which produced refugees to events which
occurred prior to 1951.24 Accordingly, the Protocol was drafted

to grant equal status to all refugees who fall25 within the Conven-

tion definition, without regard to the dateline.
The Protocol actually serves a dual purpose. Among the
nations which are parties to the Convention, it is an agreement
to update the terms of the Convention, while between states which
are not parties to the Convention, it is an independent multilateral
treaty. 26 The Protocol's general approach, with respect to refu-

gees' rights while within the borders of a contracting party, is to
27
assure that refugees are granted due process of law.
In transmitting the Protocol to the Senate for its advice and
consent, President Johnson stressed that the Protocol was a com-

prehensive Bill of Rights for refugees which would permit them
to become self-supporting members of free societies, living under
dignified conditions. 28 In urging the Senate to approve the Proto24.
25.
26.
27.
28.

Statement of Laurence A. Dawson, supra note 18, at 6.
Protocol, supra note 5, at 6224.
Protocol on Refugees, supra note 17, at 63.
Letter to President Johnson, supra note 10, at VI.
Significant portions of the President's message follow:
The Protocol constitutes a comprehensive Bill of Rights for refugees
fleeing their country because of persecution on account of their political
views, race, religion, nationality, or social ties. .

.

.

Foremost among

the humanitarian rights which the Protocol provides is the prohibition
against expulsion of return of refugees to any country in which they
would face persecution. . . . [R]efugees are to be accorded rights
which . . . would enable them to cease being refugees, and instead to

become self-supporting members of free societies, living under conditions
of dignity and self-respect.
It is decidedly in the interest of the United States to promote this
United Nations effort to broaden the extension of asylum and status for
those fleeing persecution. .

.

.

[A]ccession by the United States to the

Protocol would lend conspicuous support to the effort of the 'United Nations toward attaining the Protocol's objectives everywhere. This impetus would be enhanced by the fact that most refugees in this country
already enjoy the protection and rights which the Protocol seeks to secure for refugees in all countries. Thus, United States accession should
help advance acceptance of the Protocol and observance of its humane
standards by States in which . . . guarantees and practices relating to

protection and other rights for refugees are less liberal than in our own
country ...
United States accession to the Protocol would thus constitute a significant and symbolic element in our ceaseless effort to promote everywhere the freedom and dignity of the individual and of nations; and to
secure and preserve peace in the world.
Letter of Transmittal from President Johnson to the Senate, August 1, 1968, S.
EXEC. K, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. III (1968) [hereinafter cited as Letter from President Johnson].
In describing the Protocol to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, one
of the witnesses stated:
The protocol is a human rights document. The human rights which
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col, he stated that it was clearly in the interests of the United
States to promote the "United Nations effort to broaden the extension of asylum and status for those fleeing persecution."2 9 In
the President's words, accession would amount to both "a significant and symbolic element" in furthering individual as well as
national dignity and freedoms.3"
H.

RECENT IMPLICATIONS

To date, no court has determined the impact of the Protocol
and Convention upon sections 203 (a) (7), 212(d) (5) and 243 (h)
of the Immigration and Nationality Act.A
However, in several cases involving the Protocol, the implications which arise
32
are unmistakable. Two of these cases, Kan Kam Lin v. Rinaldi
and Chim Ming v. Marks,33 dealt directly with claims for protection under the terms of the Protocol and Convention.
Both cases rested on similar facts and involved the same
issues. Most, if not all, of the plaintiffs were persons born in
China, who had fled to Hong Kong or Taiwan during or after the
Communist takeover. Kan Kam Lin consolidated seven actions
by Chinese who, as alien seamen, had violated the Act either by
entering the United States illegally, or by overstaying the period
it covers for the refugees involved are of the most crucial and the most
important type. They are literally the difference between life and death
for many of them. They are in all cases the difference between the opportunity to live in dignity as a decent, self-supporting, self-respecting
human being, or else in the absence of such opportunity, to languish in
camps or otherwise in a state of dependency.
Statement of Laurence A. Dawson, supra note 18, at 4.
The Protocol and Convention have also been referred to as the Refugee
Magna Charta. Address by Frank L. Kellogg, Special Assistant to the Secretary
of State for Refugee and Migration Affairs at Cambridge, England, on February

25, 1975, 72

DEP'T STATE BULL.

373 (1975).

29. Letter from President Johnson, note 28, supra.
30. Id.
31. See Matter of Dunar, Int. Dec. No. 2192, Apr. 17, 1973. Cf. Kan Kam
Lin v. Rinaldi, 361 F. Supp. 177, 184 (D.N.J. 1973), aff'd per curiam, 493 F.2d
1229 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 874 (1974); Chim Ming v. Marks, 367
F. Supp. 673, 679 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), affd per curiam, 505 F.2d 1170 (2d Cir.
1974). Several cases have tangentially mentioned the Protocol. See, e.g., Muskardin v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 415 F.2d 865 (2d Cir. 1969); Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Stanisic, 395 U.S. 62, 79 n.22 (1969).
32. 361 F. Supp. 177 (D.N.J. 1973), aff'd per curiam, 493 F.2d 1229 (3d
Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 874 (1974).
33. 367 F. Supp. 673 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), af 'd per curiain, 505 F.2d 1170 (2d
Cir. 1974).
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designated on their conditional entry permits.8 4 The Chim Ming
case consolidated two claims by Chinese alien seamen who had
overstayed the authorized period.3" Following deportation hearings
and denials of asylum requests, the actions were commenced to
prevent deportation, relying upon the Protocol and Convention.
The issues in the Chim Ming case, also applicable to Kan
Kam Lin, were twofold: first, whether the plaintiffs were in fact
refugees within the meaning of the Protocol, and second, if they
were refugees, whether they were entitled to protection under the
Convention. The courts assumed, expressly in Chim Ming and
impliedly in Kan Kam Lin, that the plaintiffs were refugees, but
held that none were entitled to relief. The courts in both cases
cited a statement by the Convention's drafters which indicated that
protection would be denied to "a refugee who . . . overstayed the
period for which he was . . . authorized to stay . . . ."I The
courts were undoubtedly correct in applying this statement to the
aliens who had overstayed the periods of their entry permits.
However, neither court expressly stated why the illegal
entrants were not to receive the benefits of the Convention. In
this context, both courts simply made conclusary statements that
since no plaintiffs were lawfully within the United States, as the
Convention requires, its protection could not be invoked.37 In34. Section 241(a) (2) of the Act applies to the plaintiffs in the first cateSection 252, 8 U.S.C. § 1282 (1970),
gory. 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(2) (1970).
authorizes immigration officers to issue crewmen conditional landing permits.
These permits cover the period of time which the crewman's vessel remains in port,
but with a limit of 29 days.
35. Additionally, in footnote I of the Chim Ming opinion the court said that
the case was legally and factually representative of 130 separate but similar actions
which were pending. Counsel stipulated they would be bound in each of the other
cases by the court's decision in the instant case.
36. Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on Refugees and Stateless Persons,
U.N. Doc. E/1618 at 47 (1951) [hereinafter cited as Report on Refugees and
Stateless Persons].
37. Presumably, the courts could have held that these plaintiffs had failed
to follow the requirements for regularizing their illegal status under article 31 of
the Convention. However, the courts did not do so. Article 31 provides:
Refugees Unlawfully in the Country of Refuge
1. The Contracting States shall not impose penalties, on account of
their illegal entry or presence, on refugees who, coming directly from
a territory where their life or freedom was threatened in the sense of
Article 1, enter or are present in their territory without authorization,
provided they present themselves without delay to the authorities and
show good cause for their illegal entry or presence.
In affirming Chim Ming, the Second Circuit stated:
We need only add that [the district court's] interpretation of Article
32 by no means makes the treaty a nullity and without benefit to refu-
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deed, both courts seemed too preoccupied in relating the histories
of the Protocol and Convention, and the executive and legislative
history of United States accession to give clear and concise reasons
why their applications for relief were denied. In reviewing the
history of United States accession to the Protocol, the court in
Chim Ming indicated that all:
[T]he individuals and institutions involved in [the accession]
process had a continuing belief that the Convention would not
alter or enlarge the effect of existing immigration laws, chiefly
because it was felt that our immigration laws already em38
bodied the principles of the Convention.
In light of this history, the issues presented in Chim Ming
and Kan Kam Lin become insignificant and a more pointed question arises: what purpose does the Protocol serve in the United
States against the backdrop of the Act? A reading of these cases
seems to answer this question. By implication, Chim Ming and
Kam Lin state that accession to the Protocol does not broaden the
extension of asylum and other rights for refugees within the
United States. These cases echo President Johnson's message to
the Senate implying that in every nation which adopts the Protocol except the United States, refugees' rights would be extended.
The President's apparent position was that in the United States,
accession would be merely a symbolic event.3 9
gees. There is the protection under Subsection 2 of Article 31 insofar
as it provides that "Contracting States shall allow such refugees a reasonable period and all the necessary facilities to obtain admission into an-

other country."
Chim Ming v. Marks, 505 F.2d 1170, 1172 (2d Cir. 1974).
38. Chim Ming v. Marks, 367 F. Supp. 673, 677 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), affd per

curiam, 505 F.2d 1170, (2d Cir. 1974).

Secretary Rusk stated, "United States

accession to the Protocol would not impinge adversely upon the laws of this country." Letter to President Johnson, supra note 10, at VII. President Johnson's con-

clusion was couched in similar terms: "Accession to the Protocol would not impinge adversely upon established practices under existing laws in the United
States." Letter from President Johnson, supra note 28, at Il.
During the committee hearings, the following dialog occurred:

Senator Sparkman. Is there anything in here that conflicts with our
existing immigration laws?
Mr. Dawson. .

.

. I would say that Article 32.

.

. would pose cer-

tain questions in connection with Section 241 of our Immigration and
Nationality Act. .

.

. But I do not believe it would be in conflict ...

Statement of Laurence A. Dawson, supra note 18, at 8. Finally, the Committee
in reporting favorably on the Protocol stated: "It is understood that the protocol
would not impinge adversely upon the Federal and State laws of this country."
S. ExEc. REPT. No. 14, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1968).

39. See Letter from President Johnson, note 28, supra,
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LAW AND REFUGEES

Under United States treaty law, there is no doubt that the construction of a treaty by the executive or legislative branch carries
some weight. This construction, however, is by no means conclusive upon the courts.4" A court when interpreting the Protocol
and Convention will have to construe them fairly, according to their
express provisions. Even if the President and Senate do not construe their provisions literally, a court may not deviate from their
terms.4 1
When comparing the significant provisions of the Protocol and
Convention with their counterparts under the Act, the conclusion
that the effect of the Act is neither altered nor enlarged by these
treaties must be seriously challenged. The remainder of this comment is devoted to this question.
III.

"REFUGEE" DEFINED: THE PROTOCOL AND
SECTION 203(a)(7) OF THE ACT

The Immigration and Nationality Act does not define the
word "refugee" nor provide for asylum in the United States.4 2 Section 203(a)(7) merely authorizes the Attorney General to grant
conditional entries to aliens who can satisfy an immigration officer
that:
(i) because of persecution or fear of persecution on account
of race, religion or political opinion they have fled (I) from
any Communist or Communist-dominated country or area,
or (I) from any country within the general area of the Middle East, and (ii) are unable or unwilling to return to such
country or area on account of race, religion or political
opinion. . . .43
The courts and the Immigration and Naturalization Service
strictly construe this section by requiring that several factors be
present before agreeing to an alien's eligibility. First, the alien
40. Factor v. Laubenheimer, 290 U.S. 276 (1933).

See Kolovrat v. Oregon,

366 U.S. 187 (1961); Newington v. United States, 354 F. Supp. 1012 (E.D. Va.

1973).
41. See Valentine v. United States ex rel. Neidecker, 299 U.S. 5 (1936).
42. Matter of Dunar, Int. Dec. No. 2192, Apr. 17, 1973.

43. Act, supra note 11, § 1153(a)(7) (1970). This section was not made
a part of the Act until its addition by Pub. L. No. 89-236, 79 Stat. 913 (1965).
Prior to its inclusion, refugees had been admitted under laws passed to deal with
each group of refugees as it arose. 111 CONG. REC. 24225 (1965) (statement by
Senator Edward Kennedy). For a brief treatment of these various refugee enactments, see 4 INT'L LAWYER 709 (1970).
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must actually flee the country.44 Second, the flight must be the
result of actual or anticipated persecution based on race, religion
or political opinion. 4" Third, only an alien fleeing from Communist, Communist-dominated or Middle East countries can enter
under this section. 46 Fourth, the alien must be unable or unwilling to return to the country from which he fled because of race,
religion, or political opinion.4 7 A final requirement, not stated
in the section but added by judicial interpretation, is that the alien,
after fleeing, may not have "firmly resettled" in any other country
before seeking admission to the United States.48
44. See Shubash v. District Director Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 450
F.2d 345 (9th Cir. 1971) (Jordanian resident of Jerusalem left city for personal
reasons; city was subsequently occupied by Israel in aftermath of 1967 war; Service
denied alien's application under section 203 (a) (7)).
45. Matter of Shirinian, 12 I.&N. Dec. 392 (1967) (alien feared criminal
penalties as opposed to persecution on account of race, religion, or political opinion; application denied).
46. Min Chin Wu v. Fullilove, 282 F. Supp. 63 (N.D. Cal. 1968). Accordingly, no refugees can be admitted from the Western Hemisphere, from those areas
of Africa outside the Middle East, or from the Indo-Pakistani subcontinent. Western Hemisphere aliens are covered under section 101(a) (27) of the Act, 8 U.S.C.
§ 1101(a)(27) (1970), and section 201(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1151(a) (1970).
47. Shubash v. District Director Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 450
F.2d 345 (9th Cir. 1971). The court stated, "statutory conditions (i) and (ii)
. . . both must be met."
48. Rosenberg v. Yee Chien Woo, 402 U.S. 49 (1971). The alien fled Communist China in 1953, arriving in Hong Kong where he remained until 1960. His
application under section 203(a) (7) was denied by the Service on the grounds that
he had been firmly resettled in Hong Kong. The District Court found he had
not been firmly resettled, and the Ninth Circuit affirmed, concluding that the
alien's resettlement was not relevant. In holding that the resettlement concept was
relevant, the Court, in a 5-4 decision, indicated that Congress had not intended
to open the United States to refugees who had found a haven in a third country
and who had begun to build new lives. The Court spelled out the resettlement
concept by stating:
The District Director applied the correct legal standard when he determined that Section 203(a) (7) requires that "physical presence in the
United States [be] a consequence of an alien's flight in search of
refuge," and further that "the physical presence must be one which is
reasonably proximate to the flight and not one following a flight remote
in point of time or interrupted by intervening residence in a third
country reasonably constituting a termination of the original flight in
search of refuge."
402 U.S. at 56-57 (footnote omitted).
Following this statement the Court said:
The legal standard employed by the District Director and approved here
today does not exclude from refugee status those who have fled from
persecution and who make their flight in successive stages. Certainly
many refugees make their escape to freedom from persecution in successive stages and come to this country only after stops along the way.
Such stops do not necessarily mean that the refugee's aim to reach these
shores has in any sense been abandoned.
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An alien who desires to apply for a conditional entry into the
United States will find the procedural requirements to be rather
restrictive. For example, there are only eight countries in the world

where an application for conditional entry will be accepted by
American authorities.4 9 Such an application may not be made within the United States, but must be made while the alien is physically
present within one of the specified countries.50 Further, an alien
must not be a national of the country in which he applies for conditional entry.5 1 Barring special executive or legislative action,
the combined effect of the interpretation of section 203 (a) (7)
and its administration is undoubtedly to exclude most recognized
402 U.S. at 57 n.6.
Justice Stewart, speaking for the minority, emphasized that the words "firmly
resettled" had been omitted from section 203 (a) (7), although they had appeared
in that section's predecessors prior to 1957, and even though the State Department
had expressly requested that they be inserted. He concluded that section 203(a)
(7) is unambiguous in not requiring firm resettlement.
Justice Stewart also called attention to a statement madc by Senator Edward
Kennedy defining refugees:
Refugees are those persons displaced from Communist dominated
countries or areas, or from any country in the defined area of the Middle
East because of persecution, or fear of persecution, on account of race,
religion, or political opinion. They must be currently settled in countries other than their homelands.
111 CoNG. REc. 24227 (1965) (emphasis added).
For factors determinative of the resettlement concept, see Chi-Wai Lui v. Pilliod, 358 F. Supp. 542 (N.D. I11. 1973) (aliens after fleeing Communist China
resided in Hong Kong six and fourteen years, respectively; request denied); Min
Chin Wu v. Fullilove, 282 F. Supp. 63 (N.D. Cal. 1968) (ailens lived in Dominican Republic nine and fourteen years, respectively, after fleeing China; request denied); Chow Lung Shen v. Esperdy, 428 F.2d 293 (2d Cir. 1970) (alien lived
in Taiwan for nine years; request denied); Matter of Chai, 12 I.&N. Dec. 81
(1967) (alien lived in Hong Kong for five years but was not accorded any rights
inconsistent with refugee status; request granted); Matter of Hung, 12 I.&N. Dec.
178 (1967) (alien lived six to seven years in Hong Kong, but was admitted to
United States as a student while still a minor, and whose family had been paroled
into United States as refugees; request granted).
Arguably, the very fact that the refugee seeks admission to the United States
shows he is not "firmly resettled".
49. Application for conditional entry into the United States may be made
only in Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Greece, Hong Kong, Italy, and Lebanon. See 8 C.F.R. § 235.9(a) (1974).
50. Chan Hing v. Esperdy, 262 F. Supp. 973 (S.D.N.Y. 1966); 8 C.F.R.
§ 235.9(a) (1974).
In Tai Mui v. Esperdy, 371 F.2d 772 (2d Cir. 1966), the
court held that section 203(a)(7) was not invalid for failing to list the United
States as one of the locations where a refugee could apply for a conditional entry.
Accord, Cheng Ho Mui v. Rinaldi, 408 F.2d 28 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 395 U.S.
963 (1969).
51. Min Chin Wu v. Fullilove, 282 F. Supp. 63 (N.D. Cal. 1968).
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refugee groups from entry into the United States. 52
The Protocol definition of "refugee" is much broader than
the class described by section 203(a)(7),5 3 both in terms of the
circumstances in which the alien finds himself, and in terms of
his national origin. For the purpose of the Protocol, a "refugee"
is any person who:
[O]wing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons
of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social
group or political opinion, is outside the country of his
nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling
to avail himself of the protection of that country, or who, not
having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence is unable or, owing to such fear, is
4
unwilling to return to it.5
It can be seen that, unlike the requirements of the Act, a
refugee under the Protocol need not have fled the country. He
must merely be outside it for the reasons stated.5 5 This may occur
through the refugee's flight for the reasons stated, or as a result
of happenings subsequent to his departure which make him fearful of returning. 6 However, it must be noted that unlike section
203(a)(7), the Protocol and Convention do not provide for entry
5 7
into the territory of a contracting nation.
The refugee's absence must be a result of a "well-founded
fear" of persecution. "Well-founded" means that the refugee
must actually have been a victim of persecution, or he must be
able to show good reasons why he fears persecution."' Because
52. Fragomen, supra note 15, at 63. For examples of special executive action see note 15, supra. For an example of special legislative action, see 121
CONG. REc. H3326 (daily ed. Apr. 24, 1975), which refers to H.R. 6381.
53. Remarks, supra note 15, at 248. It was further commented that, "the
convention covers persecutees from the entire world; Section 203 (a) (7), only
Eastern Hemisphere refugees." Since the date of this talk, the Attorney General
has provided for refugees from Communist China by the addition of Hong Kong
as one of the countries within which a refugee can apply for entry under section
203(a)(7). See 8 C.F.R. § 235.9(a) (1974).
54. Protocol, supra note 5, at 6224. The Protocol by incorporating the Convention also specifies persons who are not entitled to relief under the definition.
See Convention, supra note 8, art. I(C)-(F) at 6262-6264.
55. Weis, The Concept of the Refugee in InternationalLaw, 87 JOURNAL Du
DRorr INTERNATIONAL 928, 972 (1960) [hereinafter cited as Concept of the
Refugee].
56. Id.
57. See Statement of Laurence A. Dawson, supra note 18, at 10. See generally Convention, supra note 8, arts. 2-34.
58. Report on Refugees and Stateless Persons, supra note 36, at 39.
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of the words "well-founded," the refugee's fear must contain an
objective element in addition to the usual subjective concept of
fear.

59

The Protocol definition adds nationality and membership in
a particular social class to the race, religion and political opinion
requirements which the refugee may plead under the Act. The
Protocol makes no limitation upon the type of government, or the
part of the world from which the refugee is escaping. Finally,
the concept of "firmly resettled" plays no part in the interpretation
of the Protocol's provisions.
IV.

AN UNFAVORABLE COMPARISON: ARTICLE
CONVENTION

AND SECTION

243(h)

33 OF THE

OF THE ACT

"Foremost among the humanitarian rights which the Protocol
provides is the prohibition against expulsion or return of refugees
to any country in which they would face persecution . . .,,0
This right and the recognized exceptions to it are set forth in
article 33:
Prohibitionof Expulsion or Return
1. No Contracting State shall expel or return a refugee in
any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where
his life or freedom would be threatened on account of his
race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social
group or political opinion.
2. The benefit of the present provision may not, however,
be claimed by a refugee whom there are reasonable grounds
for regarding as a danger to the security of the country in
which he is, or who, having been convicted by a final judgment of a particularly serious crime, constitutes a danger to
the community of that country.6 1
By its wording, article 33 grants a substantive right to which
a refugee is entitled if the appropriate criteria are met. 62 The
refugee has the right not to be expelled from the asylum country.
The absolute quality of that right, within the scope required by
the article, is couched in the strongest of terms by the use of the
59. Concept of the Refugee, supra note 55, at 970.
60. Letter from President Johnson, supra note 28, at III.

61. Convention, supra note 8, at 6276.
62. If the Protocol is the refugee's Bill of Rights, then the articles of the
Convention made applicable to the United States are substantive rights. See text
accompanying note 28, supra.
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words, "in any manner whatsoever." Only where the refugee's
presence can reasonably be said to be a threat to national security,
or where, as a result of a conviction of a serious crime, he is considered to be a danger to the community, can he be returned to
the country from which he fled.
Section 243(h) of the Act is the counterpart to article 33,03
and provides:
The Attorney General is authorized to withhold deportation of any alien within the United States to any country in
which in his opinion the alien would be subject to persecution on account of race, religion, or personal opinion .... 64
Under section 243 (h) an alien has no right comparable to that
granted under article 33. This section merely "authorizes" but does
not require consideration of persecution claims.6 5 The determination whether an alien will be expelled from the United States rests
with the discretion of the Attorney General. The alien has no enforceable right, but must hope for the favorable exercise of the Attorney General's discretion. 66 In this respect, courts have held that
under section 243(h), relief is not a matter of right, but a matter
67
of grace.
Under article 33, the claimant's entitlement to protection
from expulsion relates back to the Protocol definition of refugee,
and in particular to his "well-founded fear" of persecution. If the
claimant can show the objective as well as subjective elements of
his fear, and that his fear is for the specified reasons, he is entitled to relief from expulsion.6
Under section 243(h), however,
an alien must demonstrate a "clear probability of persecution" before the Attorney General can act favorably upon his request for
withholding of deportation.6 9 The question then arises whether
the terms "well-founded fear" of persecution and "clear probabil63. Letter to President Johnson, supra note 10, at VIII.
64. Act, supra note 11, 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h) (1970).
65. Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Stanisic, 395 U.S. 62, 71 n.10
(1969).
66. Id.
67. Jay v. Boyd, 351 U.S. 345 (1956); Chao-Ling Wang v. Pilliod, 285 F.2d
517 (7th Cir. 1960); Sovich v. Esperdy, 319 F.2d 21 (2d Cir. 1963).
68. See Concept of the Refugee, supra note 55, at 970-72.
69. Cheng Kai Fu v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 386 F.2d 750 (2d
Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 1003 (1968); Lena v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 379 F.2d 536 (7th Cir. 1967); Rosa v. Immigration & Naturalization
Serv., 440 F.2d 100 (1st Cir. 1971); cf. Hamad v. Immigration & Naturalization
Serv., 420 F.2d 645 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
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ity of persecution" mean essentially the same thing. If they do
not, then the respective scopes of the article 33 and section 243 (h)
requirements are not co-extensive, and it must be determined which
enactment prevails.
A.

The Dunar Case

The Supreme Court has not ignored inconsistencies between
the terms of article 33 and those of section 243 (h) . 7 But to
date, the only case which has dealt with the question whether article 33 supersedes section 243(h) is Matter of Dunar.71 In this
case, the Board of Immigration Appeals concluded that article 33
had effected no substantial change in the application of section
243(h). In reaching this conclusion, the Board considered three
areas of possible conflict between the enactments: burden of
proof, coverage, and manner of arriving at decisions.
On the burden of proof issue, counsel for the claimant argued
that since under article 33 all an alien need show is a "wellfounded fear" of persecution, the alien should be relieved of showing a "clear probability of persecution" as required by section
243(h). Under this argument, the primary test is whether this fear
exists in the alien's own mind. The Board, in rejecting counsel's
argument, stated that "if all [the claimant] can show is that there is
a mere conjectural possibility of persecution, his fear can hardly
be characterized as 'well-founded'." 2 To support its conclusion
that the "well-founded" concept does not supersede section
243(h) of the Act, the Board reviewed the legislative history
70. Kan Kam Lin v. Rinaldi, 361 F. Supp. 177 (D.N.J. 1973), af'd per
curiam, 493 F.2d 1229 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 874 (1974). This court
was referring to the following statement made in Immigration & Naturalization
Serv. v. Stanisic, 395 U.S. 62, 79 n.22 (1969):
[Ilt is premature to consider whether, and under what circumstances,

an order of deportation might contravene the Protocol and Convention

Relating to the Status of Refugees, to which the United States acceded

on November 1, 1968.
71. Int. Dec. No. 2192, Apr. 17, 1973. Dunar was a native of Hungary who
was admitted to the United States as a nonimmigrant visitor and who remained
longer than permitted. The supercession issue was the second of two issues raised
on Dunar's behalf. His first contention was that he was immune from deportation
because of article 32 of the Convention. The Board of Immigration Appeals held
to the contrary.
Decisions of the Board of Immigration Appeals are binding only upon officers and employees of the Immigration Service. See 1 C. GORDON & H. ROSENFIELD, IMMIGRATION LAW AND PROCEDURE, § 1.10b (rev. ed. 1975).

72. Int. Dec. No. 2192, Apr. 17, 1973, at 16.
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which expresses the general feeling that existing immigration laws
already provide for the reforms in the Convention and Protocol. In
further support of its conclusion, the Board surmised that by its
amendment in 1965, section 243(h) had been brought into har-

mony with article 33 .7

There is no doubt that under either article 33 or section
243 (h), the burden of proof is upon the claimant to show that he is
entitled to relief. 74 In Dunar, the Board seemed to require that
the alien produce a significant amount of evidence in support of
his persecution claim.7 5 But in the case of a refugee, such a re73.

Prior to 1965, section 243(h) had read:
The Attorney General is authorized to withhold deportation of any
alien within the United States to any country in which in his opinion
the alien would be subject to physical persecution...
Immigration and Nationality Act, ch. 477, § 243(h), 66 Stat. 214 (1952) (emphasis added). "Physical persecution" was held to mean confinement, torture, or
death inflicted on account of race, religion or political viewpoint. Blazina v.
Bouchard, 286 F.2d 507 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 950 (1961).
Blazina
involved an alien crewman who had jumped ship and who alleged persecution because of his desertion. The court stated that punishment under such circumstances was a criminal sanction reconcilable with generally recognized concepts
of justice. Accord, Zupicich v. Esperdy, 207 F. Supp. 574 (S.D.N.Y. 1962), aff'd,
319 F.2d 773 (2d Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 933 (1964). But see Sovich
v. Esperdy, 319 F.2d 21 (2d Cir. 1963).
Following its amendment in 1965 by Pub. L. No. 89-236, section 243(h) was
given a more liberal treatment by the courts. In Kovac v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 407 F.2d 102 (9th Cir. 1969), under facts similar to Blazina, the
court recognized that the act of seeking asylum could be grounds for persectuion.
The court suggested that the Board of Immigration Appeals had equated the seaman's fear of punishment for desertion with fear of punishment for having sought
asylum. It pointed out that Congress had not intended to make the United States
a refuge for common criminals, but it did intend to grant asylum to those who,
if returned, would be punished criminally for violating a politically motivated prohibition against defection from a police state. The court also recognized that deliberate imposition of substantial economic disadvantage could bring the claimant
within the scope of section 243 (h).
74. See Concept of the Refugee, supra note 55, at 986; 8 C.F.R. § 242.17(c)
(1974).
In hearings conducted pursuant to section 243(h), the government
normally offers no proof. 1 C. GORDON & H. ROSENFIELD, IMMIGRATION LAW
AND PRoCEDuLE § 5.16b(e) (rev. ed. 1975).
75. Under section 243(h), the claimant must show a "clear probability of
persecution." See text accompanying note 69, supra. "Probability" has been defined variously as, "[t]he likelihood of a proposition or hypothesis being true,
from its conformity to reason or experience or from superior evidence or arguments adduced in its favor;" or, "[a] condition or state created when there is more
evidence in favor of the existence of a given proposition than there is against it."
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1364 (4th ed. 1951) (emphasis added). Addition of
the word "clear" to the phrase above seems to place an even greater burden upon
the proponent of the evidence.
Dunar's persecution claim was based on an assertion coupled with evidentiary
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quirement may result in an unjust outcome. 7" Because of his
flight, a refugee may have no documentation or witnesses to relate
the facts of his particular case. As a result, he may be unable
77
to introduce evidence which sufficiently supports his position.
In such a situation, the real issue becomes the claimant's credibility.78 Therefore, as a matter of reality, the concept "wellfounded fear" of persecution should require a lesser burden of
proof than that of "clear probability of persecution."
The Board compared the mandatory terms of article 33 to
the discretionary nature of the Attorney General's authority to decide whether article 33 compelled a change in the Attorney General's determination process. No conflict was found. The Board
implied that the Attorney General's broad discretionary powers
provide sufficient protection for a claimant. 79 This position was
supported by a statement that the Board was aware of no cases
in which the Attorney General's discretionary relief had been denied where the alien showed a "clear probability of persecution." 80
support that he would face criminal prosecution in Hungary for having departed
illegally. He also claimed that his long stay in Western Europe and then in the
United States would lead Hungarian authorities to consider him a possible
proselytizer of capitalism.
The immigration judge and Board concluded that imposition of a penalty for
illegal departure would not be so severe as to be considered persecution. For differing views as to whether penalties for illegal departures from Communist territory or vessels can be considered persecution, compare Blazina v. Bouchard, 286
F.2d 507 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 950 (1961) with Sovich v. Esperdy,
319 F.2d 21 (2d Cir. 1963), and Kovac v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv.,
407 F.2d 102 (9th Cir. 1969).
76. See Concept of the Refugee, supra note 55, at 986.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Examination of section 243(h)'s predecessor reveals a statute which can
be more closely associated with the meaning of article 33 than the present one.
Under section 20(a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1917, as amended
by section 23 of the Internal Security Act of 1950, 64 Stat. 987, 8 U.S.C. § 156
(a) (1946, Supp. IV), the courts held that when an alien alleged persecution in
the country to which he was to be deported, the Attorney General had to find
as a fact that he would not be subject to physical persecution before he could be
sent there. United States ex rel. Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 187 F.2d 137 (2d
Cir. 1951), aff'd, 342 U.S. 580 (1952); Sang Ryup Park v. Barber, 107 F. Supp.
603 (N.D. Cal. 1952); United States ex rel. Chen Ping Zee v. Shaughnessy, 107
It would seem that with enactment of section
F. Supp. 607 (S.D.N.Y. 1952).
243(h) in 1952, a dramatic shift in policy occurred.
80. The Service's appellate trial attorney made this statement in his brief:
In actual practice there has been no case under Section 243(h) in
which it has been held that the Attorney General's discretion dictated
the deportation of an alien to a country where there was a well-founded
reason to believe that he would be persecuted. If such a contingency
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This reasoning clearly misses the point. Under article 33
the claimant has been granted a substantive right. Under section
243(h) the claimant has no substantive rights, only procedural
ones."' To state that the Attorney General's discretion has not
were to arise, it is inconceivable that it could arise in anything other
than the context permitted under paragraph 2 of Article 33, namely, national security or danger to the community.
Matter of Dunar, Int. Dec. No. 2192, Apr. 17, 1973, at 20 n.20. The Service's
Assistant Commissioner for Inspections made a similar comment on a separate
occasion:
In actual practice, there has been no case under Section 243(h) in
which it has been held that the Attorney General's discretion dictated
the deportation of an alien to a country where there was a well-founded
reason to believe that he would be persecuted.
The plain fact is that, as long as Section 243(h) has been in the
statute, an alien who established such a well-founded fear has been accorded the benefits of Section 243(h).
Remarks, supra note 15, at 250. But see Radic v. Fullilove, 198 F. Supp. 162
(N.D. Cal. 1961) (alien seaman introduced extensive evidence showing persecution to himself and his family if forced to return to Yugoslavia, but Service denied
relief on basis of a file, contents of which were not revealed to him); Sovich v.
Esperdy 319 F.2d 21 (2d Cir. 1963) (appellant escaped from Yugoslavia after
several unsuccessful attempts and eventually entered United States as alien seaman; after being ordered deported, relief under section 243(h) was denied by
Service despite evidence showing religious and political opposition to communism,
anti-regime statements, warnings by Yugoslavian officials, and escape to Italy);
Kovac v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 407 F.2d 102 (9th Cir. 1969) (Service denied relief to appellant who alleged persecution at hands of Yugoslavian officials because of his Hungarian extraction and refusal to inform on Hungarians
in Yugoslavia following 1956 Hungarian revolution).
The Assistant Commissioner followed his statement above by stating:
Indeed, interpretations of Section 243(h) have gone much further
than would appear to be authorized by an interpretation of the definition
in Article I and the language in Article 33 of the Convention. For example, it has been held that economic deprivation could permit characterization of the alien's possible treatment as "persecution", whereas
Article 33 refers in specific language to a threat to "life and freedom"
only.
Remarks, supra note 15, at 250. It should be noted, however, that this interpretation was mandated by the courts, not the Service. See, e.g., Kovac, supra this
note.
81. Sovich v. Esperdy, 319 F.2d 21 (2d Cir. 1963). The court stated:
[Tihe applicant under Section 243(h) is not without rights. . . . The
applicant is entitled to procedural due process. . . . He has a right to
have his application considered, . . . and this consideration must be
given in conformity with the pertinent regulations promulgated by the
Attorney General himself.
Id. at 24. Procedural due process is not violated where the Attorney General denies the applicant's request on the basis of confidential information, unavailable
to either the court or the applicant, the disclosure of which would be prejudicial
to the public interest or national security. Jay v. Boyd, 351 U.S. 345 (1956);
Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206 (1953); United States
ex rel. Dolenz v. Shaughnessy, 206 F.2d 392 (2d Cir. 1953); Sovich v. Esperdy,
319 F.2d 21 (2d Cir. 1963). However, without a contention by the government
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yet been improperly exercised is tantamount to denying the existence of the right under article 33. Alternatively, it is an impli-

cation that a public official's discretion is a satisfactory substitute
for an individual's enforceable substantive right. Further, the reviewability of the Attorney General's discretionary decisions leaves
little hope for a refugee who has been denied relief. The courts
will generally decline to review the merits of the alien's case and
will confine themselves to determining whether the Attorney Gen82
eral has abused his discretion.
In all fairness to the Board and the Immigration Service, the
conservative attitudes and narrow interpretations in such cases undoubtedly result from abuses of the asylum procedure.8 3 These
abuses occur when aliens make frivolous claims for asylum in
order to gain additional time in the United States pending the determination of their cases. 84 However, to do justice to the spirit
of the Protocol and Convention, article 33 should be liberally
construed in a humanitarian manner.8 5
B.

Applicability of Section 243(h) and Article 33

Section 243(h) has been severely criticized because of its
narrow scope and its technical construction by the courts. It has
that the document's disclosure would harm national security, due process is violated. Radic v. Fullilove, 198 F. Supp. 162 (N.D. Cal. 1961).
82. Muskardin v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 415 F.2d 865 (2d Cir.
1969). Discretion would be abused if a determination:
[Were made without a rational explanation, inexplicably departed from
established policies, or rested on an impermissible basis such as an invidious discrimination against a particular race or group ...
Wong Wing Hang v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 360 F.2d 715, 719 (2d
Cir. 1961). In United States ex rel. Dolenz v. Shaughnessy, 206 F.2d 392, 39495 (2d Cir. 1953), the court stated:
[T]he withholding of deportation in cases where the alien fears persecution rests wholly in the administrative judgment and "opinion" of the
Attorney General or his delegate. The courts may not substitute their
judgment for his. Doubtless a court might intervene to stay deportation,
if the Attorney General or his delegate should deny the alien any opportunity to present evidence on the subject of persecution or should refuse
to consider the evidence presented by the alien.
However, in cases where the court disagrees with the Attorney General's finding
for reasons other than denying the alien a chance to present his evidence, the
court will state that the Attorney General erroneously construed the standards to
be employed in exercising his discretion. See, e.g., Sovich v. Esperdy, 319 F.2d
21 (2d Cir. 1963); Kovac v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 407 F.2d 102
(9th Cir. 1969).
83. See, Remarks, supra note 15, at 252.
84. Id.
85. Concept of the Refugee, supra note 55, at 986-88.
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been characterized as "badly needing reform,"8 6 and as affording
"only a tenuous grip on political asylum."8 7 A study of cases
which arose as a result of section 243(h) led one writer to conclude that success in persuading the Attorney General to withhold
deportation is not easily achieved. 8"
Only those aliens who are "within the United States"8 may
invoke the protection of section 243 (h).11 To determine whether an alien is "within the United States" it is necessary to determine his classification under the Act. Immigration laws have consistently distinguished between aliens who are merely seeking
admission, and aliens who have entered the country, legally or
illegally."' In the terms of the Act, aliens in the first category who
are being deported are subjected to exclusion proceedings, while
those in the other category are subjected to expulsion proceedings.

9

2

The difference between the two types of proceedings is
significant since aliens involved in expulsion proceedings are
granted rights and privileges which are not extended to those in
the excludable alien classification. 98 Where deportation is being
contested by an alien, courts distinguish expulsion from exclusion
and apply the rule that an excluded alien is not eligible for section 243(h) protection.9 4
When a refugee enters the United States pursuant to section
203(a)(7), and subsequently becomes inadmissible for per86. Fragomen, supra note 15 at 64 n.60.
87. Evans, Political Refugees and the United States Immigration Laws:
Further Developments, 66 AM. J. INT'L L. 571 (1972).
88. Evans, Political Refugees and the United States Immigration Laws, 62
AM. J. INVT'L L. 921 (1968).
89. Act, supra note 11, § 243(h), 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h) (1970).
90. See Leng May Ma v. Barber, 357 U.S. 185 (1958).
91. Id.
92. id. at 187. The Court pointed out that the word "deportation" may be
used generically to refer to either type of proceeding. However, as a word of
art, "deportation" refers only to expulsion proceedings.
93. Id.
For an excellent discussion of this distinction see Wenzell &
Kolodny, Waiver of Deportation: An Analysis of Section 241(f) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 4 CALIF. W. INT'L L.J. 271 (1974).
94. The Supreme Court in Leng May Ma v. Barber, 357 U.S. 185 (1958),
stated:
Section 243(h), ...
was inserted by the Congress not among Chapter
4's "Provisions Relating to Entry and Exclusion," but squarely within
Chapter 5-a strikingly inappropriate place if.. . . it was intended to
apply to excluded aliens.
Id. at 190 (emphasis in original).
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manent residence, he may be subjected to exclusion hearings. 95
If found to be excludable and deportation is ordered, the refugee
seemingly cannot avail himself of the benefits of section 243(h).9 6
A refugee who has been paroled into the United States under
section 212(d) (5) is in virtually the same position. If it is determined that neither emergency nor public interest justifies his continued presence, the refugee is subjected to exclusion proceedings. 9 He is not "within the United States" for the purposes of
section 243(h), and therefore, may not invoke its protection.9"
It can be seen that a paroled refugee or a section 203
(a)(7) refugee who is physically present within the United States
is prohibited from invoking section 243 (h) because of his excludable alien classification. The practical effect of this prohibition
is to deny an alien, who is physically but not technically present,
a hearing on his asylum request.
Under article 33, there is no counterpart to the excludable
alien classification. This article specifies only two grounds for denial of relief to a refugee who is physically within the country:
national security and conviction of a particularly serious crime. 99
Therefore, article 33 has a much broader application than section
243(h), since it embraces all refugees in the country, not merely
those who are both physically and technically present.
V.

SUGGESTED APPROACH

The preceding sections have contrasted the broad scope of
the Protocol and Convention with their restrictive counterparts in
the Act. Because the Protocol defines "refugee" in much broader
95. 8 C.F.R. § 235.9(f) (1975).

96. No cases have been found in which a conditional entrant has been denied a section 243(h) hearing. However, in Wing Wa Lee v. Immigration &
Naturalization Serv., 375 F.2d 723, 724 n.1 (9th Cir. 1967), the court stated:

Apparently the difference between an immigrant visa and a condi-

tional entry is that if the alien is found undesirable he can be "excluded"

under a conditional entry but must be "deported" under an immigrant
visa.
Furthermore, 8 C.F.R. § 235.9(f) (1974) explicitly subjects conditional entrants
to exclusion proceedings when determining their deportability. Therefore, they
would not be entitled to section 243(h) relief. See note 93, supra.
97. 8 C.F.R. § 212.5(a) (1975).
98. Leng May Ma v. Barber, 357 U.S. 185 (1958); Siu Fung Luk v. Rosenberg, 409 F.2d 555 (9th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 396 U.S. 801 (1969). See also,
Ahrens v. Rojas, 292 F.2d 406 (5th Cir. 1961); United States ex rel. Stellas v.
Esperdy, 366 F.2d 266 (1966).
99. Convention, supra note 8, art. 33(2).
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terms than the class described under section 203(a)(7), it might
seem that this section should be superseded. However, when a
statute and a later treaty cover the same matter and are, to a degree
reconcilable, a court must give effect to them both. 100 Such
would appear to be the case in this situation. The entire thrust
of section 203 (a) (7) is to grant certain refugees entry into the
United States. 10 1 The Protocol deals with the rights of refugees
after entry. 0 2 Although both enactments describe who may gain
asylum, since the Protocol in no way relates to entry, section
203(a)(7) would not be superseded.
In adopting section 203 (a) (7), Congress envisioned two
classes of refugees: those abroad who are seeking to enter the
United States, and those who have already entered under this section and who have been within the United States at least two
years. ' The conditional entry procedure was adopted for refugees in the first class.104 Refugees in the second class may apply
for adjustment of status to be eligible for permanent residence. 10
A third class consists of refugees admitted under section 203 (a)
(7)106 who have not been able to adjust their status because the
two year requirement has not been fulfilled or other conditions
have not been satisfied. These refugees, as excludable aliens,
have substantially fewer rights than those who have been able to
adjust their status.' 017 An alien whose status has been adjusted
is granted the complete protection of the Constitution when he is
involved in expulsion proceedings.10 8 Therefore, in reference to
100. Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190 (1888); United States v. Lee Yen
Tai, 185 U.S. 213
(C.C.P.A. 1939).

(1902); John T. Bill Co. v. United States, 104 F.2d 67

101. Wong Pak Yan v. Rinaldi, 429 F.2d 151 (3d Cir. 1970); see Wing Wa
Lee v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 375 F.2d 723 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
389 U.S. 856 (1967); Tai Mui v. Esperdy, 371 F.2d 772 (2d Cir. 1966).
102. See Concept of the Refugee, supra note 55, at 940.

103. Tai Mui v. Esperdy 371 F.2d 772 (2d Cir. 1966).
104. Id.
105. Act, supra note 11, § 203(a) (7), 8 U.S.C. § 1153(a)(7) (1970).
106. See Cheng Ho Mui v. Rinaldi, 408 F.2d 28 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 395
U.S. 963 (1969); Tai Mui v. Esperdy, 371 F.2d 772 (2d Cir. 1966).

107. For coverage of rights not afforded to aliens under exclusion proceedings, see note 108, infra.
108. Compare the rights of aliens in each type of proceeding below:
Exclusion proceedings

The hearing is normally closed except by request of the alien; the immigration judge must inform the alien of the nature and purpose of the hearing, that
he has the right to counsel, an opportunity to present evidence, examine and object to evidence, and to cross examine witnesses. 8 C.F.R. § 236.2(a) (1975).
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expulsion, a refugee whose status has been adjusted has no need
for the protection of the Protocol and Convention. However, by
giving effect to both the Protocol and section 203 (a) (7), refugees
in the third class would receive more right than they now possess.

If any section of the Act is ripe for supercession, it is
section 243 (h). 109 A court in determining whether that section
is superseded will, quite naturally, proceed with caution because
of contrary statements made during the Protocol's accession
process. But a court should not hesitate to construe the treaty
obligations liberally." 0 Since a treaty is the law of the land, the
court must interpret it according to its terms."' Repeal by implication, which would be required in this case, is not favored by
the courts, and requires a "positive repugnancy" between the
terms of the statute and treaty."' But where the enactments coyExpulsion proceedings
The alien may apply for voluntary departure. 8 C.F.R. § 242.5 (1975). In
case of respondent's mental incapacity, a guardian, near relative or friend may
appear in his behalf. 8 C.F.R. § 242.11 (1975). No finding of deportability is
valid unless clear, unequivocal and convincing evidence is presented to show the
facts alleged as grounds for deportability are true. 8 C.F.R. § 242.14(a) (1975).
The immigration judge must advise respondent of his right to counsel, to examine
and object to evidence, present evidence, and cross-examine witnesses. The hearing is generally open to the public. 8 C.F.R. § 242.16 (1975).
The immigration judge must inform the respondent he has the right to apply
for suspension of deportation under section 244(a) of the Act, for adjustment of
status under section 245, or for creation of a record of lawful admission for permanent residence under section 214(d) or section 249. 8 C.F.R. § 242.17(a)
(1974). The respondent may designate the country of deportation and an alternate. He must be informed he can apply for withholding of deportation under
section 243(h). 8 C.F.R. § 242.17(c) (1975).
109. See text accompanying notes 60-99, supra.
110. See Valentine v. United States ex rel. Neidecker, 299 U.S. 5 (1936); Eck
v. Arab Airlines, 241 F. Supp. 804 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
111. See Valentine v. United States ex rel. Neidecker, 299 U.S. 5 (1936).
112. In Wood v. United States, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 341, 362 (1842), the Court
in attempting to determine whether an act of Congress had been repealed by a
subsequent act stated:
The question then arises, whether [the act in question] has been
repealed, or whether it remains in full force. . . . mhe question resolves itself into the more narrow inquiry, whether it has been repealed
by necessary implication. We say, by necessary implication; for it is not
sufficient to establish, that subsequent laws cover some or even all of
the cases provided for by it; for they may be merely affirmative, or cumulative or auxiliary. But there must be a positive repugnancy between
the provisions of the new law, and those of the old; and even then, the
old law is repealed by implication, only pro tanto, to the extent of the
repugnancy.
This principle was applied in United States v. Lee Yen Tai, 185 U.S. 213 (1902),
where the Court resolved the question of whether a treaty had, by implication,
repealed an earlier act of Congress.
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er the same area, and it is not possible to give effect to both, a
later enactment must prevail if it is self-executing." 3 This is particularly true where that enactment is broad and its terms are clear
and explicit so that it can be seen to cover the entire area." 4
The terms of article 33 meet the supercession requirements.
First, both it and section 243(h) cover the same area: the prevention of expulsion of a refugee to a country where he will be
subjected to persecution. Second, the requisite "positive repugnancy" exists between the concepts "well-founded" fear of perecution, and "clear probability of persecution."
Because the
"well founded" concept should require a lesser burden of proof,
the requirements of article 33 should be less stringent than those
of section 243 (h). Third, it does not appear possible to give effect to both enactments without radically altering the interpretation of section 243 (h) or watering down article 33. Finally, the
United States adhered to the Protocol, a self-executing treaty, after Congress enacted section 243 (h) .15
For these reasons, when this issue is raised, a court should
hold that article 33 supersedes section 243(h). Because immigration law is basically a product of the legislative branch of government, a court might be inclined to hedge on the subject of
supersession and hold that article 33 does not prevail. In this
eventuality, the court should at least urge Congress to bring section
243 (h) into agreement with article 33.
It seems paradoxical, once having determined that an alien
is a refugee under the Act, to deny the protection of section
234(h) on the basis of a classification of excludable alien. This
The Court in Johnson v. Brown, 205 U.S. 309, 321 (1907), stated:
[A] later treaty will not be regarded as repealing an earlier statute by implication, unless the two are absoluteJy incompatible and the
statute cannot be enforced without antagonizing the treaty.

See also United States v. Borden Co., 308 U.S. 188 (1939); Gardner v. The
Danzler, 281 F.2d 719 (4th Cir. 1960).
113.

See Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190 (1888); United States v. Lee

Yen Tai, 185 U.S. 213 (1902); United States v. Rathjen Bros., 137 F.2d 103
(C.C.P.A. 1943); Farbenfabriken Bayer v. Sterling Drug, 148 F. Supp. 733
(D.N.J. 1957).

114. Frost v. Wenie, 157 U.S. 46 (1895); Minerva Automobiles v. United
States, 96 F.2d 836 (C.C.P.A. 1938). See United States v. Lee Yen Tai, 185
U.S. 213 (1902); John T. Bill Co. v. United States, 104 F.2d 67 (C.C.P.A. 1939).
115. Congress originally passed section 243(h) in 1952 and most recently
amended it in 1965. See note 73, supra. The United States adhered to the Protocol in 1968. See note 6, supra. For the self-executing aspect of the Protocol,
see Matter of Dunar, Int. Dec. No. 2192, Apr. 17, 1973, at 6.
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classification when applied to refugees who are physically, but not
technically present in the United States contravenes the spirit and
plain words of article 33. Additionally, it fails to meet the requirements of United States asylum policy.
An attempt to tighten loopholes which allow mala fide claims
for asylum seems to be behind the restrictive interpretations and
nature of section 243(h)." 6 Such an attempt is commendable
due to the undesirability of the success of these claims. But even
more undesirable than the success of a mala fide claim for asylum
is the failure of a bona fide claim. Adoption of article 33 in lieu
of section 243(h) would be a step in the proper direction foreclosing the possibility of failure of a bona fide claim for asylum.
VI.

CONCLUSION

7
The most urgent need of the refugee is to gain asylum."
Once he is within the territory of the contracting nation and meets
the other basic requirements of the Protocol and Convention, he
is guaranteed such asylum. The United States has an international treaty obligation to implement the Protocol within areas subject to its jurisdiction," 8 and United States asylum policy requires
that aliens who request asylum be given a complete opportunity to
have their requests considered on their merits." 9 However, the
present state of immigration law denies paroled refugees and section 203(a)(7) refugees an opportunity to have their requests
considered under section 243 (h). Continuation of such a practice by invoking the exclusion-expulsion technicality and ignoring article 33 of the Convention makes accession to the Protocol a virtually meaningless gesture. If accession is to be truly
meaningful, humanitarian concepts dictate that technicalities not
be used as a means to deny asylum.

DonalM. Hill

116. See generally 96 CONG. REc. 5451 (1950)
Carran).
117. Convention on Refugees, supra note 16, at 3.
118. Policy Statement, note 4, supra.

(remarks of Senator Mc-

119. Id.
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